Effective deterrence of leader transgression is necessary for economic development, and coordinated resistance by citizens is key to deter leader transgression. Leaders, however, often employ a divide-and-conquer strategy to prevent successful coordinated resistance. This paper presents a laboratory experiment to investigate how social motivations and free-form communication (Rich Communication) can facilitate coordinated resistance. In our experiment, a leader first decides whether to extract surplus from a victim and shares it with a beneficiary. We provide direct statistical evidence that victims and beneficiaries communicate with different intensity and content: victims more quickly and vigorously engage in communication, while beneficiaries propose to acquiesce more frequently. The successful joint resistance rate increases almost four-fold (from 15 to 58 percent) when moving from the more restrictive communication treatments to Rich Communication. We also find that the significant impacts of rich communication are driven more by the responders' ability to send free-form messages rather than the multiple and iterative opportunities to indicate intentions.
Introduction
This paper presents a laboratory experiment to study how computer-mediated free-form communication can facilitate coordinated resistance against leader transgression. Since the seminal work of North and Weingast (1989) , a sizable literature has emphasized that successful economic development requires mechanisms that deter the predatory behavior of the state: if political leaders can confiscate the wealth of citizens without any repercussion, no one will have the incentive to engage in costly production and investment (North, 1990; Weingast, 1995 Weingast, , 1997 Acemoglu et al., 2005; Greif, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) . Scholars have argued that coordinated resistance by citizens is key to deter leader expropriation (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, chapter 11) . Researchers, however, have also pointed out that leaders may expropriate wealth from one group, and share it with another group to "bribe" them and secure their support (Weingast, 1995 (Weingast, , 1997 . Such divide-and-conquer strategies are difficult to defeat. Citing the former Congo ruler Mobutu as an example, Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that divide-and-conquer tactics allow rulers to adopt socially costly policies to extract surplus, and this is an important cause of under-development.
In his pioneering work on divide-and-conquer (hereafter DAC), Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 considers a Coordinated Resistance (hereafter CR) Game played by a leader and two responders.
In the CR game, the leader first decides whether to extract surplus from one of two "responders," but shares some of this confiscated surplus with the other responder to gain her support. The two responders then simultaneously decide whether to challenge the leader. The leader's transgression is defeated if and only if both the "victim" and the "beneficiary" of the transgression incur the cost to challenge. Successful transgression increases the payoff of the leader and the beneficiary, but it lowers the total surplus available and harms the victim.
In this social dilemma, deterring the leader from practicing divide-and-conquer is difficult. It requires the beneficiary to act against her material interest, and also to successfully coordinate with the victim to challenge the leader. If the beneficiary is only concerned about her own material payoff she will never challenge the leader, so the efficient outcome of No
Transgression cannot be supported as equilibrium in the one-shot CR game with standard preferences. In addition, because a beneficiary who is only concerned about her own material payoff will never challenge, allowing the victim and the beneficiary to engage in any form of non-binding "cheap talk" communication will not increase coordinated resistance against divideand-conquer in the one-shot CR game.
As we shall discuss in detail in Section 2, however, social motivations such as concerns for fairness, the pursuit of expressive utility, or guilt aversion may motivate a beneficiary to act against her narrow material interest to challenge DAC transgression. If responders have the opportunity to send free-form messages, they can make statements that heighten the importance of social motivations to increase the prospect of successful joint resistance. Therefore, compared to restrictive communication that only allows the responders the opportunity to indicate their intended action, free-form communication (hereafter rich communication) is likely to be more effective in facilitating coordinated resistance in the CR game. Our paper reports an experiment to test this conjecture.
To focus on how rich communication and concerns beyond narrow self-interest help coordinate resistance, we abstract from repeated interaction in this study. 1 In the Rich Communication treatment, after observing the leader's decision but before deciding whether to resisting (Chen, 2009; Amnesty International, 2012; Chang, 2012) . At the risk of suffering from harassment or sometimes even arrest, legal scholars, lawyers, and activists have campaigned on behalf of the victims and advocated for legal and administrative reforms to address this growing problem (Smith, 2009; Liu, 2010a; Amnesty International, 2012) .
After the death of Ye Zhongcheng in 2010, who set himself on fire to protest the demolition of his house in Jiangxi province, a local government official argued in defense that the recent rapid urbanization of China was impossible without land expropriation, and "everyone is the beneficiary of forced demolition" (Si, 2010) . Nevertheless, various activists have argued that due to the suffering of the large number of victims of land expropriation, their conscience does not allow them to remain silent (Guo, 2005; Liu, 2010b) . Importantly, the internet has increasingly become an important platform for victims of expropriation and forced demolition to publicize their grievances and appeal to the public for help (Liu, 2010a; Hu, 2012) .
While the potential importance of rich communication in facilitating coordinated resistance is well-recognized, to our knowledge no empirical study investigates systematically how and why the content of communication may coordinate resistance against a specific act of divide-and-conquer transgression, even though the content of online discussion is often publicly observable.
This lack of research is due, in part, to the numerous challenges faced by field studies on this topic. First, individuals who choose to participate actively in online groups may already have a strong inclination to participate in collective action against state transgression. This raises the possibility that any observed impact of communication in the field may mainly be driven by a selection effect. Second, researchers usually do not know the economic, political and social incentives faced by different individuals or the actions taken by them beyond their discussion.
This makes it difficult to understand how different incentives affect the content of communication, as well as how the content of communication in turn affects behavior. Third, some messages may be fabricated. For example, the Chinese government has paid agents to participate in on-line discussions to send pro-government messages or raise questions to influence the direction of on-line discussion (Trouillaud, 2011 The internet offers an instructive example of this process. The phenomenon of group polarization-the observation that group discussion moves decisions to more extreme points in the same direction as the initial tendencies of the group members' individual choices-was first identified in the laboratory by experimental social psychologists (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Isenberg, 1986) , and subsequently studied in the laboratory by experimental economists (Cason and Mui, 1997) . The legal scholar Cass Sunstein (2000 Sunstein ( , 2007 draws on these and other related laboratory studies to formulate the influential hypothesis that the internet may make it easier for people to limit themselves to news and information outlets that confirm to their prior views. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) recently test this hypothesis using field data. Exploiting the better control available in the laboratory, a small number of recent studies use the laboratory to study social conflicts, ranging from anarchy and conflict, divide-and-conquer, to riot and revolution (see Abbink (2012) for a survey).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CR game and discusses how rich communication and social motivations can affect behavior. Section 3 presents the experimental design and the content analysis methodology. Section 4 reports results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Divide-and-Conquer, Coordinated Resistance, and Rich Communication Figure 1 illustrates the laboratory CR game, which is based on a game-theoretic model of divide-and-conquer that Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 develops in his pioneering work that captures the following ideas. First, successful transgression allows the leader to extract surplus from the responders and increases his private payoff, even though it reduces total surplus in society because some surplus is destroyed in the process. In the Figure 1 payoffs, a comparison of the leader's payoff without transgression (the bottom matrix) to the case when he successfully transgresses against both responders (the top matrix) shows that successful transgression against a responder increases the leader's payoff by 3 but reduces the responder's payoff by 6. Second, challenging is costly to the responders regardless of whether it succeeds, and the transgression will fail if and only if both responders incur the cost to challenge. Third, multiple equilibria exist in the top subgame when the leader transgresses against both responders. Both responders challenging the leader and both responders acquiescing are possible equilibrium responses, so this subgame is a "stag hunt" game. Fourth, the leader can either transgress against both responders, or can also use a DAC strategy. In the Figure 1 payoffs when the leader transgresses against only one responder he shares 1 of the 3 units of the expropriated surplus with the "beneficiary" responder in an attempt to gain her support. When the leader transgresses against only one responder and shares some of the extracted surplus with the beneficiary in the one-shot game, a beneficiary with standard preferences will always acquiesce, so the victim of transgression will also acquiesce. Therefore, by using the DAC strategy the leader can eliminate the threat of coordinated challenge by the responders. The one-shot CR game thus has three (pure strategy) equilibria, all featuring some form of transgression. 3 In one equilibrium, the leader transgresses against both responders, with the expectation that such full-scale transgression will not be met by coordinated resistance. The other 3 Allowing for mixed-strategy equilibrium does not change the key implications of the CR game, so we shall focus on pure-strategy equilibria. Chen et al. (2010) on how providing information about others' contributions to public goods affect contribution behavior in field experiments. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) argue that their findings in a public good experiment without confidentiality suggest that subjects are of three types: those who never contribute, those who are internally motivated and always contribute, and those who are subject to social influence. For a general discussion of priming, see Bargh (2006) . Chen et al. (2014) reports an economic experiment showing how priming different identities affect behavior in the prisoner's dilemma. 7 In a trust game, the first-mover decides how much money to send to the second-mover. Capturing the idea that such "investment" is socially desirable, the amount received by the second-mover is higher than the original amount sent. The second-mover then decides how much money to send back to the first-mover. Dufwenberg (2006, 2010) report that communication in a trust game that allows the second-mover to send a written free form message increases cooperation more than another treatment with restrictive binary promises to cooperate.
challenge the leader, and the victim will hence challenge and expects to get the material payoff of 7. If the beneficiary instead acquiesces, she will cause the victim to get the lower material payoff of 1. Because "defection" from challenge to acquiesce will cause the victim to get a lower material payoff, if the beneficiary is sufficiently guilt averse she will be willing to incur the cost to challenge the leader to avoid letting down the victim.
Under rich communication, the victim can explain that she has a strong belief that the beneficiary should and would challenge the leader. Furthermore, if the victim highlights the importance of fairness and ethical considerations in in her free-form messages, the beneficiary may respond with statements that make the beneficiary believe that the victim expects her to challenge the leader. Free-form communication may thus lead the beneficiary to believe that acquiescence will let down the victim, and may motivate a guilt averse beneficiary to act against her material interest to challenge a DAC transgression.
Our discussion so far emphasizes how the victim has the incentive to engage in rich communication to make arguments that can induce the beneficiary to challenge. While a beneficiary who has concerns beyond narrow material interest may also actively participate in free-form communication, a beneficiary who has standard preferences prefers the DAC transgression to succeed. Consistent with Schelling's observation that in asymmetric games, some agents may prefer not to have communication opportunities even though communication is beneficial to others (Schelling, 1957) , a beneficiary who is motivated only by her own material interest has little incentive to engage in communication. This suggests that there will be systematic qualitative and quantitative differences in the messages communicated by the victims and the beneficiaries. We expect that victims are likely to communicate more and are more likely to appeal to social motivations in order to convince the beneficiaries to coordinate resistance.
We have emphasized that rich communication may affect behavior because it offers both the victim and the beneficiary the opportunity to make specific arguments that heighten the importance of various social motivations that can help them coordinate resistance. To provide a more direct test that the free-form statements are key for allowing rich communication to affect behavior, our study also includes two restrictive communication treatments that permit the responders to communicate intended actions and to engage in iterative coordination, but remove the possibility of making free-form statements.
In the restrictive, and hence is less likely to follow through on an indicated intention to challenge compared to rich communication. In addition, an expressive beneficiary has the incentive to follow through on an agreement to challenge the leader, as doing so will confirm that she is trustworthy and also trusting. Restrictive communication does not allow the victim or the beneficiary to make statements to highlight the importance of being trusting and trustworthy, so it may be less powerful in inducing an expressive beneficiary to follow through on an agreement to challenge the leader. We therefore conjecture that compared to both forms of restrictive communication, beneficiaries are more likely to follow through on an agreement to challenge DAC reached through rich communication.
Experimental Design and Content Analysis Methodology

Experimental Design
The experiment consists of 45 independent sessions across seven different treatments, as summarized in Table 1 , conducted at Purdue and Monash Universities using 510 human subjects.
All subjects were inexperienced in the sense that they participated in only one session of this study, although some had participated in other completely unrelated experiments. Sessions were conducted in all seven treatments at both universities. This design is chosen to permit important pairwise treatment comparisons to identify how different forms of communication affect behavior, and evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to alternative matching protocols.
In order to closely approximate the "one-shot" version of the game analyzed here, we employed "strangers" matching protocols that anonymously and randomly re-grouped subjects in each decision period. This permits subjects to learn about the strategic environment they face through stationary repetition, while minimizing any repeated game incentives. The Random Strangers treatments shown on the left side of Table 1 are the major treatments of the experiment. Each session in these treatments had nine participants, but two sessions were always conducted simultaneously so 18 subjects were present in the lab for each data collection period.
The instructions emphasized that subjects were randomly re-grouped each period. The regrouping occurred separately within the two groups of nine subjects in the lab, although this was not mentioned in the instructions. The random strangers matching protocol means that when subjects are randomly matched to form three person groups each period, responders can be matched with another responder or leader more than once in a session.
As shown in Table 1 , we conducted four treatments using this random strangers matching protocol. The No Communication treatment is a baseline to evaluate the impacts of alternative forms of communication. The treatment with Simultaneous Restrictive Communication, reported previously in Cason and Mui (2007) , allowed the responders to send a restrictive, binary message to the other responder in their group: an "intended" choice (either X or Y), prior to committing to an actual challenge or acquiesce decision. 8 Only the two responders exchanging the messages, and not the leader, observe the message content. These binary messages were exchanged simultaneously; that is, a responder did not learn the other's message until after submitting her message. In all of the communications treatments, the responders first learn the transgression choice of the leader and then exchange messages for only the subgame chosen by the leader. The data from 144 subjects in the two treatments just described provide benchmarks for evaluating other communication protocols. The remaining new data from 366 subjects in five treatments were specifically collected for this study. The use of data from treatments in earlier studies as a foundation for later studies is an important part of our research program for the study of divide-and-conquer. It allows us to use these treatments to evaluate how new and increasingly sophisticated communication environments may affect behavior in this social dilemma and obtain cumulative benefits from this research program. As we have learned from previous studies of important social dilemmas such as the prisoner's dilemma and public good games, cumulative studies involving dialogues and iterations between experiments, theory building, and field studies have significantly deepened our understanding of important issues (Ostrom, 1998; Camerer, 2003) . The CR game developed in the influential work of Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 ) is a rich social dilemma that has interesting endogenous role asymmetry, and provides a tractable environment for the cumulative study of the important question of divide-and-conquer. 9 In the Rich Communication treatment, the two responders have the opportunity to send free-form messages through a chat window after they observe the choice made by the leader but before they make their actual choices. The leader does not observe these messages, but these messages are recorded by the experimenter. The chat window allows responders exchange multiple messages over a two-minute period. In order to measure the importance of the opportunity to send free-form messages, separately from the multiple and iterative opportunities to indicate their intended choices, in the Multi-Round Sequential Restrictive Communication treatment subjects can send a sequence of binary "intended" choice communications to their paired responder. One responder is chosen randomly to send the first message. This message is revealed only to the other responder, who then replies with a binary intended resistance choice, which is revealed to the first. Another round of binary intention messages is then exchanged, and this is followed by the simultaneous choice of the actual resistance decision. These two rounds of 9 Weingast (1995) and Weingast (1997) have 1,887 and 1,169 Google Scholar cites, respectively (July 15, 2014) . While concerns about leader expropriation and under-development motivate our study, DAC is widely observed in many other settings. A defendant facing multiple plaintiffs may make different settlement offers to the plaintiffs to induce plaintiffs to settle their claims for less than they are jointly worth (Che and Spier, 2008) . A firm that is negotiating contracts with several unions may offer poor terms to some and more favorable terms to others to create divergent interests among the unions (Kutalik and Biddle, 2006 ). An incumbent monopolist can use DAC to achieve "naked exclusion" (Rasmusen et al., 1991) . Landeo and Spier (2009) and Boone et al. (2014) study experimentally how incumbent monopolist can use divide-and-conquer to achieve "naked exclusion." None of these studies, however, considers rich communication. Landeo and Spier (2012) considers a naked exclusion game between a seller, two buyers, and a potential entrant, and finds that compared to no communication, unrestrictive one way communication from the potential entrant to the buyers reduces exclusion by the seller. They, however, do not investigate whether the buyers and the entrant may communicate differently, nor do they use content analysis to study the messages of the entrants. They also do not compare rich communication to restrictive communication, while we focus on comparing rich communication to various forms of restrictive communication to determine whether the opportunity to send free-form messages is the driving force behind the effects of rich communication. It is possible that a responder may try to identify himself in the Rich Communication treatment, or may recognize the other responder in later periods based on how this individual chats in the random strangers matching protocol. This can imply that repeated game considerations between the responders can potentially affect behavior. To investigate whether this is a serious issue for our experiment, we added three supplementary treatments with the Perfect Strangers matching protocol, shown on the right side of Table 1 . In these Perfect Strangers treatments, subjects are randomly matched to form three person groups each period, but with the restriction that a responder is matched with another responder exactly once in a session. This allows us to conduct robustness tests to investigate whether any differences in behavior (if they exist) across these treatments observed in the random strangers environment still hold in the perfect strangers environment.
10
Each session in these perfect strangers treatments had 24 subjects-16 responders and 8 leaders. The instructions emphasized that subjects were randomly re-grouped each period, and that a responder would be matched with another responder for once and exactly once in the 10 We also investigate this question from the other extreme. When rich communication takes place in the random strangers treatments, in 10 out of the 14 sessions the chat program did not display the participant number of the two communicating responders. This "anonymous" environment makes it more difficult for participants to use chats to identify their identity. We also conducted four sessions using the "non-anonymous" option in the chat program. In these sessions, the computer screen displayed the participant ID of both responders during the chat in each period. We found, however, that behavior in the random strangers Rich Communication treatment is qualitatively similar in the "anonymous" environment and the "non-anonymous" environment. We therefore pool the data of these 14 random strangers Rich Communication treatment together in our analysis. 11 Exchange rates were chosen before beginning data collection based on the time required to complete pilot sessions. Sessions without communication ran more quickly-some as short at 75 minutes including instructions-while those with communication typically required 1.5 to 2.5 hours.
Content Analysis
Responders can express a variety of statements in the chat rooms, and to quantify these statements formally we employ the methodology of content analysis. For this purpose we employed two coders, who were undergraduate students at Purdue and Monash Universities, to review all the statements (8403 lines of messages) and classify them according to a message classification scheme developed based on pilot sessions. These coders were trained using pilot data and they coded the chat statements independently. They were unaware of the research questions addressed in this study and did not know the leaders' or responders' decisions. Each individual line of a chat was coded, and the coders judged whether each line fit into 35 specific meaning categories and subcategories. Individual chat lines could be assigned to multiple categories. (Krippendorff, 2003; Cohen, 1960 ) is a scaled measure of agreement that takes a value of 0 when the amount of agreement is what random chance would imply, and 1 when the coders agree perfectly.
12 Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered "Moderate" agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate "Substantial" agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977) . We consider only message classifications that reach the "Moderate" agreement threshold.
Results
The results section is organized in 3 subsections. 
Rich Communication
For the content analysis our coders classified messages in 35 categories and subcategories. Some categories were used infrequently, and others were not reliably classified across the two coders. Table 2 presents the frequency that different types of chat statements that were frequently expressed and reliably coded for responders when they faced DAC transgressions for the Rich communication sessions, separately for the victim and beneficiary roles. 13 Beneficiary and victim subjects each exchange 2.2 to 2.6 chat messages on average per two-minute chat period respectively, so the number of messages is similar to the number we implemented exogenously in the Multi-Round Sequential Restrictive Communication treatment.
Our first result provides direct evidence to the conjecture that victims indeed are more active in sending free-form messages, and are more likely to appeal to social motivations than the beneficiaries to convince the beneficiaries to engage in coordinated resistance.
Result 1: Victims more frequently express the first message in the chat dialog, and express more messages than beneficiaries overall. Victims also more frequently appeal to the other responder to be "fair" and to harm the leader. Beneficiaries propose to acquiesce more frequently. Table 2 indicates that, consistent with the conjecture that victims should be more eager than beneficiaries to utilize communication to affect behavior, victims send the first message in over 62 percent of the chats. This is significantly more often than beneficiaries send the first message, and victims express 18 percent more messages overall than do beneficiaries. Victims also propose to acquiesce only 5 percent of the time, compared to 20 percent by beneficiaries, and they appeal to the other responder to be fair about twice as frequently as do beneficiaries.
Support:
Victims also propose being "nasty" to the leader about 50 percent more often than to beneficiaries.
14 These patterns provide direct statistical evidence that the asymmetric incentives faced by victims and beneficiaries lead them to communicate with different intensity and content in interesting and intuitive ways. Victims more quickly and vigorously engage in the chat communication. As we document below, beneficiaries indicate an intention to resist and actually do resist at higher rates in this Rich communication treatment than in other treatments, but they do so less frequently than do victims. indicated this resist intention during the chat for that period and the subject agrees (classification category "agree with other person's proposal / confirmation of agreement"). Although coding in these categories is reliable, we distinguish between cases when both coders identify resistance intensions from cases when only one coder identifies intended resistance. As shown below the results are qualitatively similar for the two cases.
We first test the conjecture that beneficiaries are more likely to indicate an intention to challenge under rich communication than under both forms of restrictive communications. Table 3 displays the intended resistance rates for these three treatments. In order to test whether the intended resistance rates are significantly different, we employ one independent observation from each session in conservative Mann-Whitney tests. Support: To document these performance differences we employ a simple statistical test that does not need to condition on intentions expressed, using one statistically independent observation per session. p-value=0.71) , indicating that it is opportunity to send free-form messages rather than merely exchange multiple messages that increases effective resistance.
Leader Transgressions and Surplus Distribution
Greater responder resistance is associated with lower leader transgression, which is apparent from the scatter plot of these two measures shown in Figure 2 . Each dot represents one of the 45 independent sessions. The next result indicates that the pattern of transgression rates across treatments mirrors the DAC resistance rates documented in the previous result. Support: Table 6 reports the leader transgression rates for the individual sessions and for 5-period blocks pooling across sessions within treatments. The highest transgression rates are in the No Communication baseline, and the reduction in these rates for the Simultaneous Restrictive treatment is modest and not statistically significant n=m=8) . 
Conclusions
Using the CR game in Weingast (1995 Weingast ( , 1997 Brosig et al. (2003) finds that face-to-face communication increases public goods contributions more than video-conferencing, while Bochet and Putterman (2009) finds that allowing subjects to send free-form non-binding written messages increases public goods contributions more than a treatment in which subjects can only send non-binding numerical announcements. Similarly, Oprea et al. (2013) find that rich chat communication is more effective for increasing cooperation than restrictive and limited language in a continuous time public goods game.
All the above studies consider symmetric games such as the prisoner's dilemma or public good games, in which players face exactly the same incentives. Thus, when a player offers a specific argument to support why she plans to cooperate and uses the same argument to urge others to cooperate, that argument can be particularly persuasive. A richer format of communication may enable players to better exploit this "empathy effect" in a symmetric environment, and further increase cooperation.
In the CR game considered here, by contrast, a significant asymmetry exists between the victim and the beneficiary and this asymmetry is endogenously determined by the leader. The (2005)), in a 5-4 decision, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that an urban development plan that "will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and increased tax revenue" serves a "public purpose" and satisfies the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment.
This ruling provides justification for government taking of properties and transferring them to private parties for development by equating "public purpose" to "public use" in the original taking clause of the Fifth Amendment. It has sparked a heated debate and led to legislation by many states to limit the government's use of eminent domain (Kerekes, 2011) . In her dissenting opinion, justice O'Connor argued that "(a)ny property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more" (Kelo vs. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
To investigate the impact of such asymmetry, future research can consider a modified CR game in which an exogenously designated beneficiary first decides whether to request that the leader transgress against a victim. If the leader complies, the victim then has the opportunity to engage in rich communication with a fourth player whose material payoff is not affected by the transgression. The victim can send free-form messages to persuade the "outsider" to act against her material interest to incur the cost to challenge the transgression. The outsider can now never suffer from DAC transgression, so the social motivations she faces may be different from those faced by a beneficiary in our current CR game. Careful study of this CR game with outsiderenforcement and its variations will enable us to understand whether rich communication can still facilitate coordinated resistance in such environments.
